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The Optional Protocol to the Women's
Convention: An Argument for Ratification
This Note examines the significance of the Optional
Protocol in securing. the human rights of women. It
will start by looking at the Women's Convention and
the rights secured by it. Then the articles of the
Optional Protocol will be examined and compared
with existing individual complaints procedures used by
the other major treaty bodies. The final sections will
detail existing mechanisms for monitoring compliance
with the Women's Convention and discuss why the
Optional Protocol is so essential.
I. INTRODUCTION
On the last Human Rights Day of the twentieth century,
December 10, 1999, the Optional Protocol I to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(Women's Convention) was opened for signature, ratification, and
accession, thereby marking a historic breakthrough for the human
rights of women. In the words of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations,
[w]e can all take pride in the event we are marking
today. I can think of no better way to celebrate this
last Human Rights Day of a century which has seen
great advances in women's rights, than by adding this
important instrument to our tool-kit in ensuring women
really do enjoy those rights.2
1. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999), 39 I.L.M. 281 (2000), available at http://www.un.org
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/op.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Optional
Protocol].
2. United Nations, Secretary-General Says It Is Duty of All to Be 'Vigilant and
Articulate Custodians' of Women's Anti-Discrimination Convention, http://www.un.org/
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The Optional Protocol entered into force on December 22, 2000,
following the ratification of the tenth state party to the Convention.
The Optional Protocol gives individuals and groups of individuals the
opportunity to bring individual complaints when any of their rights
under the Convention have been violated by a state party to the
Women's Convention and the Optional Protocol, and they have
exhausted domestic remedies. The Optional Protocol also provides
for an inquiry procedure whereby the Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee) can initiate
its own examination, with the cooperation of the state party, of
information regarding grave or systematic violations of rights set
forth in the Women's Convention by a state party.
By accepting the Optional Protocol, states demonstrate their
commitment to the equality of women and the eradication of all forms
of discrimination against them by providing their female nationals
with the ability to enforce their rights at the international level.
Although ultimately women's human rights need to be secured at the
national level in order for women to truly enjoy their human rights on
a daily basis, a commitment on the international plane will enable
states to safeguard more carefully women's rights at the national
level. The Optional Protocol stands as a mechanism to secure
women's rights as states continue to make the necessary changes in
their domestic law to avoid seeing cases brought against them on the
international plane.
This Note will first look at the Women's Convention and
detail the substantive rights that it provides. It will then look at the
Optional Protocol and its individual complaints procedure for
enforcing the rights found in the Women's Convention and contrast it
to existing individual complaints procedures for enforcing treaty
rights provided by other human rights treaties. The last sections will
detail what procedures have been available to monitor compliance
with the Women's Convention, discuss why the Optional Protocol is
so essential, and what it adds to existing means of securing human
rights.
womenwatch/daw/news/pressop.htm (Dec. 10, 1999); see also Kofi A. Annan, Preface, in
THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL: TEXT AND MATERIALS, at v (U.N. Division for the Advancement
of Women ed., 2000).
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II. THE WOMEN'S CONVENTION
The Women's Convention, the culmination of more than thirty
years of work of the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, is the
most comprehensive international human rights treaty to focus on
women. It notes in its preamble that "extensive discrimination
against women continues to exist" and emphasizes that such
discrimination "violates the principles of equality of rights and
respect for human dignity."3
The elimination of the discrimination that persists against
women and their right to be equal before the law are crucial elements
of the Women's Convention. In Article 1, discrimination is defined
as
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the
basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status,
on a basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.4
Article 1 requires the elimination of discrimination by both the state
and private parties, and dictates that not only should the purpose of
potentially discriminatory acts be scrutinized, but also the effects.
Article 3 requires all state parties to take "all appropriate measures,
including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement
of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of
equality with men."5 Article 4 notes that acts aimed at accelerating
de facto equality between men and women will not be considered
discriminatory as long as they are in effect only as long as necessary
to achieve the object of bringing about equality between men and
women.
State parties commit to suppress the trafficking of women in
Article 6. The right to vote and participate in government and in non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) is secured by Article 7, and
nationality rights are secured in Article 9. Article 10 discusses the
3. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
adopted by the U.N. GeneralAssembly Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter Women's Convention].
4. Id. art. 1.
5. Id. art. 3.
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importance of giving women the same educational opportunities as
men and various rights in the educational field are outlined, including
career and vocational guidance; elimination of stereotypes; and access
to scholarships, sports, and family planning. The right to work is
secured as an inalienable right of all human beings in Article 11 and
provisions are included to facilitate the implementation of this right,
such as safe working conditions. The particular problems of rural
women, and rights specific to their advancement, are outlined in
Article 14. Article 15 pronounces that women shall be equal before
the law, whether making a contract, or administering property.
Although securing women's civil rights and legal equality is
given priority, it is important to note that the Women's Convention
also deals with women's reproductive rights and the role cultural
factors play in perpetuating discrimination against women, In
particular, Article 5 deals with the social aspect of discrimination.
With this article, states are committed to modifying "social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women" that lead to the idea
of the inferiority of women and that place them in the sole role of
caregiver of children. 6 Article 16 secures the right to enter into
marriage, including the right to choose a spouse and family name, and
the right to decide when and how many children to have.
Currently, there are 165 state parties to the Women's
Convention, making it the second most subscribed to human rights
treaty after the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 7  The
implementation of the Convention is monitored by the CEDAW
Committee, established in 1982 pursuant to Article 17 of the
Women's Convention. The CEDAW Committee is composed of
twenty-three experts on women's issues from around the world,
selected by state parties from among their nationals, although the
members serve in their personal capacity. 8 The CEDAW Committee
examines reports submitted by the state parties concerning their
progress in implementing the Women's Convention, presented to the
Committee by Government representatives, engages in a dialogue
with the representatives, and issues comments on these reports. 9
6. Id. art. 5.
7. Although it should be noted that many states have made their ratification of the
Women's Convention conditional upon substantial reservations.
8. CEDAW COMMITTEE, CEDAW INFORMATION NOTE 2: COMMITTEE ON TIE
ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, U.N. Doc DPI/2049/Rev.1 (Dec. 1999)
[hereinafter CEDAW INFORMATION NOTE 2].
9. id.
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III. THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
Many human rights treaties are complemented by "optional
protocols" that provide for procedures relating to the treaty or that
address a substantive area relating to the treaty.10 For example, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") has a
second optional protocol, the aim of which is the abolition of the
death penalty, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child has an
Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,
the aim of which is to seek limits on the use of children in armed
conflict and to raise the minimum age level for recruitment to
participate in hostilities. Relevant here are optional protocols which
provide an enforcement mechanism relating to the treaty. A state
does not become a party to an optional protocol merely by adhering to
the main treaty. Optional protocols are truly optional and are
separately open to signature, accession, or ratification by the countries
that are already party to the main treaty.
By signing the Optional Protocol, states can show that they
believe the human rights of women should be placed on an equal
footing with the human rights of men. Until now, the mechanisms
developed for enforcement of "women-specific" human rights
standards were not as effective as those developed for more general
"human rights" standards.11  The first optional protocol to the
ICCPR,12 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),13 and the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) 14 each establish a mechanism for the consideration of
10. U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women, What Is an Optional Protocol?, at
http://www.un.orgfwomenwatchldaw/cedaw/protocollwhatis.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2001).
11. Andrew Byrnes & Jane Connors, Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A
Complaints Procedure for the Women's Convention? Draft Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 21 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 679, 683 (1996).
12. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 301 [hereinafter ICCPR First Optional Protocol]. The treaty
itself entered into force on March 23, 1976. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adoptedby the U.N. GeneralAssembly Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2000) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
13. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter CAT].
14. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
adopted by the U.N. GeneralAssembly Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force
Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter CERD].
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individual communications. The inquiry procedure found in the
Optional Protocol to the Women's Convention is similar to the one
found in CAT. States can opt out of the inquiry procedure in the
Optional Protocol while still remaining a party to the Optional
Protocol.
Before becoming a Party to any of these instruments, states
must be truly ready to cooperate at the international level to ensure
that their practices at the national level are in accordance with the
international human rights standards found in the relevant treaty. By
accepting the individual complaint mechanisms of these treaties, a
state opens up its implementation of the treaty to international
scrutiny whenever an individual finds the state's compliance to be
inadequate. States who are parties to the other instruments can, by
signing the Optional Protocol to the Women's Convention, show that
their commitment to the human rights of women is just as great as
their commitment to civil and political rights, the elimination of racial
discrimination, and the elimination of torture.
The Optional Protocol, although similar to existing
instruments such as the first optional protocol to the ICCPR, the
complaints mechanism in CERD, and the complaint and inquiry
procedure in CAT, has some key innovations to offer. 15 The Optional
Protocol also takes advantage of the experience of these existing
instruments and therefore contains explicitly many of the features that
have been incorporated into the other instruments via their rules of
procedure.
Article 2 of the Optional Protocol allows a communication to
be submitted on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals without
their consent where the author "can justify acting on their behalf
without such consent." 16 No similar provision can be found in the
other existing instruments, although the rules of procedure of the
Human Rights Committee (-RC) (which monitors the implemen-
tation of the ICCPR), the Committee Against Torture, and the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination allow an
individual to submit a communication on behalf of an alleged victim
15. For a complete comparison of existing procedures, see Comparative Summary of
Existing Communications and Inquiry Procedures and Practices Under International Human
Rights Instruments and Under the Charter of the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-
General, Commission on the Status of Women, 41st Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.6/1997/4 (1997), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/cn6/1997/ecn619
97-4.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2001) [hereinafter Comparative Summary].
16. Optional Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2.
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who is unable to submit a communication. 17 This is significant, as
women in many parts of the world are in a particularly disadvantaged
position to bring a complaint. Two thirds of the world's illiterate
adults are women, 18 women are frequently more poverty-stricken,
may fear reprisals from family or community elders, and may be
economically dependent on those who would not want them to bring a
complaint. Therefore, concerned individuals who have the resources
to lodge a complaint can do so on behalf of such a woman whose
human rights have been violated.
The Optional Protocol to the Women's Convention, in Article
5.1, is the only such instrument that explicitly permits the Committee
to transmit a request to the state party concerned to take interim
measures to avoid "possible irreparable damage to the victim or
victims of the alleged violation." 19 This is an important improvement
since the HRC noted two instances of noncompliance within the
period under its review for its Fifty-fourth Session.20 In both cases,
the HRC had requested a stay of execution for the authors of the
communications and they were thereafter executed. 21 By having the
request for interim measures in the body of the Optional Protocol, the
Optional Protocol is a stronger tool and will hopefully induce greater
compliance.
The Optional Protocol is the only such instrument that allows
for the information that is to be considered by the CEDAW
Committee in assessing the complaint to be submitted "by or on
behalf of individuals or groups of individuals," although CAT does
allow information to be submitted "by or on behalf' of the claimant.22
Information is key in discovering whether a violation has occurred. It
17. Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, Human Rights Committee,
50th Sess., Rule 90(b), U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/3/Rev.5 (1997) [hereinafter HRC Rules of
Procedure]; Rules of Procedure, Committee Against Torture, 15th Sess., Rule 107(1)(b),
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/3/Rev.3 (1998) [hereinafter CATRules of Procedure]; Rules of Procedure,
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Rule 91(b), U.N. Doe. CERD/C
/35/Rev.3 (1989) [hereinafter CERD Rules of Procedure]. The Rules of Procedure for these
Committees are available at the website of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
http:/www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last visited Mar. 28, 2001), by selecting "Documents," "by
Type," "Basic Reference Document," selecting the relevant committee, and then scrolling
through the resulting list of documents.
18. U.N. DIVISION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, END DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN (Dec. 1999).
19. Optional Protocol, supra note 1, art. 5.1.
20. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
81, U.N. Doe. A154/40 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 HRC Report].
21. Id.
22. Optional Protocol, supra note 1, art. 7.1.
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is therefore very helpful if the claimant(s) are not the only ones
allowed to submit information, as it has already been noted that
women may lack the tools or financial resources to make a
comprehensive report on their behalf.
The rules of procedure of the Committee Against Torture and
of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination contain
provisions that enable the Committees to obtain from U.N. bodies or
specialized agencies any documentation that may assist in the
disposal of the case.23 The usefulness of the ability to consider
additional information was proven in Balabou Mutombo v.
Switzerland when the Committee Against Torture drew on a number
of reports prepared for the Commission on Human Rights in order to
conclude that a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations
of human rights existed in the country of origin of the petitioner.24
Theoretically, the submission of a complaint should be
inexpensive as an individual only needs to submit a written account of
a violation of one of their rights enumerated in the relevant treaty.
However, practically speaking, compiling an effective statement of
proof is very labor intensive, and many may be unable to submit such
a complaint without the help of an attorney. With the ability to use
information provided by the United Nations and NGOs, which may
have available information crucial to the assessment of a claim, it
should be easier and cheaper for an individual to submit a complaint
and establish a violation.
Article 7.3 of the Optional Protocol adds to the forwarding of
its views to the parties concerned, "its recommendation, if any."25
The existing instruments all state that the Committee shall forward its
views, but only CERD refers to "suggestions and recommendations, if
any."26 When the treaty bodies find a state party in violation of the
treaty, the views they forward to the concerned state party commonly
contain recommendations of actions the state party should take. 27
Once again, however, it is important to require this practice in the
body of the instrument itself. This procedure will only work on a
voluntary basis and if the state party cooperates, so it is vital to have
23. CATRules of Procedure, Rule 111(2); CERD Rules of Procedure, Rule 95(2),
24. Mutombo v. Switzerland, Communication No. 13/1993, Report of the Committee
Against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 44, Annex 5, at 45, U.N. Doe. A/49/44
(1994).
25. Optional Protocol, supra note 1, art. 7.3.
26. ICCPR First Optional Protocol, supra note 12, art. 5.4; CAT, supra note 13, art.
22(7); CERD, supra note 14, art. 14.7 (b).
27. See Comparative Summary, supra note 15, 61-66.
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the State understand what it is promising when it signs the Optional
Protocol to make the procedure more effective later.
Articles 7.4 and 7.5 of the Optional Protocol provide that the
state party shall give "due consideration" to the views and
recommendations of the Committee and furnish the Committee with
information of any action taken.28  The HRC has noted the
importance of follow-up on enforcement and described the absence of
such a provision as a "major shortcoming in the implementation
machinery established by the Covenant."29 Therefore, the HRC
established a procedure so that it could monitor the follow-up to its
views as mentioned above. 30 Follow-up information has been
systematically requested in all cases where the HRC found violations
of the ICCPR.3 1 The 53rd Committee report contained a detailed
country-by-country report of follow-up activities.32 The yearly report
now contains a list of countries that were found to be in violation of
the Convention, whether they have replied, an overview of follow-up
replies received, and the Special Rapporteur's follow-up consultations
during the reporting period. These improvements made in existing
bodies' procedures highlight the importance of the decision to provide
for follow-up within the instrument itself. The mechanism helps
assess the usefulness of the procedure, gives states an added incentive
to comply, and may aid in discovering problem areas for future
development.
The inquiry procedure found in Article 8 of the Optional
Protocol is similar to the procedure contained in Article 20 of the
CAT. However, Article 9 concerns the ability of the Committee to
request the state party to include in its report under Article 18 of the
Convention any actions taken in follow-up to the inquiry.33 This
ability has no equivalent in the CAT or in its rules of procedure.
Article 9 is an important tool whereby the Committee may see
whether its recommendations are being followed and may give the
Committee the opportunity to help in problem areas. It also gives the
Committee the weight of publicity to urge the country involved into
28. Optional Protocol, supra note 1, arts. 7.4 & 7.5.
29. Follow-up on Views Adopted Under the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/TBB/3 (1993), reprinted in Report of the Human Rights Committee, 48th Sess.,
Annex X, at 222, U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (1993).
30. 1999 HRC Report, supra note 20, at 90.
31. Id.
32. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
70-77, U.N. Doc. A/53/40 (1998).
33. Optional Protocol, supra note 1, art. 9.
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compliance, and helps define the rights of the Convention for other
state parties by seeing how they are assessed in a concrete fashion.
The Optional Protocol is the only one of such instruments to
mandate publicity of the Convention and the Optional Protocol. It
states in Article 13 "[e]ach state party undertakes to make widely
known and to give publicity to the Convention and the present
Protocol and to facilitate access to information about the views and
recommendations of the Committee, in particular,' on matters
involving that state party."'34  This is a crucial development,
especially for women, as in many countries women may be unaware
of their rights or that there are any means to enforce their rights.
Women are also not represented in as great numbers as men on the
international plane.
The HRC's main work revolves around the individual
complaints procedure, and the HRC noted that greater public
awareness of the procedure was probably an important factor in the
recent increase in communications. 35 Through seminars, workshops,
and via the press, more women and other interested individuals will
know that there is an outlet for their complaints that may bring their
national system into compliance with their country's international
obligations. The importance of publicity was repeatedly invoked at a
panel discussion on the Optional Protocol held in the ECOSOC
Chamber at the United Nations in New York, on December 10, 1999,
the day the Optional Protocol was opened for signature. At this panel
discussion, women working in all different capacities for the
advancement of the rights of women, and in all different languages,
called for more publicity of mechanisms available to women around
the globe to ensure their human rights.36
Article 17 states that reservations are not allowed. 37 States
should not become party to the Optional Protocol unless they are
serious in their commitment to all the human rights of women. The
Convention itself already suffers from a great number of reservations.
All the human rights of women are vital, and states should not be able
select only some of them or weaken the Optional Protocol in any way.
34. Id. art. 13.
35. 1999 HRC Report, supra note 20, at 74.
36. Bacre Waly Ndiaye et al., Panel Discussion on the Recently Adopted Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (Dec. 10, 1999) (including an opening statement by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, and moderated by U.N. Assistant Secretary-General Angela E.V. King).
37. Optional Protocol, supra note 1, art. 17.
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Twenty-three states expressed their commitment to the human
rights of women by signing the Optional Protocol on December 10,
1999.38 As of March, 2001, sixty-five countries have signed the
Optional Protocol, and eighteen states have ratified it.39
IV. EXISTING PROCEDURES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
Until the Optional Protocol came into force, the only method
available to monitor compliance with the Women's Convention was
the reporting mechanism. As mentioned earlier, the CEDAW
Committee monitors compliance by studying reports submitted by the
state parties and commenting on these reports. State parties are
obliged to submit reports on their efforts to give effect to the
Convention within one year of acceding to or ratifying the
Convention and then every four years thereafter.40 Based on the
report, the discussion of it with the government's representatives, and
the information received from NGOs, the Committee may suggest
areas for further action by the specific country.
The reporting procedure under the Women's Convention may
also be enhanced by the addition of the Optional Protocol. The
comments of the Human Rights Committee submitted to state parties
under Article 40 of the ICCPR, a reporting mechanism similar to the
one in the Women's Convention, have been deemed to be clearly
influenced by decisions under the ICCPR's first optional protocol, the
individual complaint mechanism of that treaty.41 The influence of the
comments of the HRC on the reports of state parties on later
individual cases is "also becoming a matter of course."42  The
findings in individual cases made under the Optional Protocol may
38. U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women, Signatures and Ratifications of the
Optional Protocol, at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/sigop.htm (as of Mar. 14,
2001).
The states who signed the Optional Protocol on December 10, 1999, are: Austria,
Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, Norway, Senegal, Slovenia, and Sweden. Id.
39. Id. The states that have ratified the Optional Protocol are: Austria, Bangladesh,
Bolivia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Mali, Namibia, New Zealand, Senegal, Slovakia, and Thailand.
40. CEDAW INFORMATION NOTE 2, supra note 8.
41. Torkel Opsal, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A CRxrIcAL APPRAISAL 369, 437 (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
42. Id.
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influence the thinking of the CEDAW Committee when examining
states' reports, leading to more effective questioning of state
representatives submitting their country's report. The reporting
mechanism may also play an important role in the hearing of
individual cases. The more information that is compiled for
international scrutiny, and the greater the dialogue between states, the
individual, and the international community, the more opportunities
there are for changes to be made that will help the situation of women
worldwide.
Although criticized as being a weak procedure, as states are
typically not willing to give information that would put them in a
negative light, the importance of reporting should not be ignored. It is
a valuable tool in opening a dialogue about a subject previously not
thought to be a part of the international plane. One observer noted,
"in fact, it is hard to imagine where else top government officials
would find themselves being so closely questioned about their
country's law and policies, and needing to justify them."43 A former
HRC member reports:
the procedure has proved to encourage implementation
of international human rights standards, mutual respect
for different systems, conditions and cultures and for
different methods of guaranteeing human rights....
There are numerous examples that states, as a result of
or having been stimulated by the reporting procedure,
have changed laws or practices, created procedures and
remedies and have spent more attention on the
realization of human rights than before.44
Although the reporting mechanism is important, the individual
complaint procedure is an essential complement. The reports are
submitted periodically, according to a set schedule, and the
information in the state parties' reports can be general, not providing
the type of detailed and precise information that would allow the
CEDAW Committee to examine a right or set of rights in depth.45
43. Torkel Opsahl, The Protection of Human Rights in the Council of Europe and in the
United Nations, 26 EUR. Y.B.I.L. 92, 106 (1978) (quoting Ms. Rachel Malcomson, Quaker
observer).
44. Bernhard Graefrath, Reporting and Complaint System in Universal Human Rights
Treaties, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING EAST-WEST PERSPECTIVE 290,312 (Allan Rosas &
Jan Helgesen eds., 1990).
45. Donna Sullivan, The Proposed Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Its Relationship to Existing
Procedures and Justiciability 4 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the U.N. Division for
the Advancement of Women).
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Extraordinary or additional reports may be requested, but this would
interfere with the review of the periodic reports.46 Although the
reporting mechanism creates a dialogue in which states can discuss
compliance in an automatic, non-adversarial context, it is not a tool to
combat individual human rights violations.
The CEDAW Committee may also make general recom-
mendations to the state parties on any issue affecting women that the
Committee thinks should be given more attention.47 As of June 1999,
the CEDAW Committee had adopted twenty-four general recom-
mendations dealing with a range of topics from reporting guidelines
to "Women and AIDS."'48 Over the years this procedure evolved
from the Committee issuing short and modest'recommendations to a
more elaborate procedure whereby the Committee involves NGOs
and others in the discussion of the topic of the general
recommendation. 49 The recommendations elaborate the state parties'
obligations under the Convention in relation to what the Committee
describes as "cross-cutting" themes. 50  One example of a very
important recommendation is General Recommendation 19, adopted
in 1992, that requires national reports to the Committee to include
statistical data on the incidence of violence against women,
information on services available to the victims, and legislative and
other measures taken to protect women against violence in their every
day lives (e.g., abuse in the family, sexual violence).51 These
recommendations are clearly an important way for the Committee to
highlight areas of special concern that are being neglected in a
widespread manner or are particularly important. However, as the
name indicates, this procedure only involves general
recommendations to all state parties and does not work to give relief
to particular individuals nor to eradicate wide-spread violations in a
specific country.
Rights need to be viewed in the context of their means of
enforcement. Ratifying a treaty shows a degree of commitment to the
values and rights it espouses. However, if there is no meaningful way
to ensure that those rights are being respected at the national level, it
46. Id.
47. CEDAW COMMITTEE, CEDAW INFORMATION NOTE 6: CEDAW GENERAL
RECOMMENDATIONS, U.N. Doe. DPI/2047/Rev.1 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter CEDAW
Information Note 6].
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. CEDAW INFORMATION NOTE 2, supra note 8.
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leads us to question whether states are really serious about their
commitment to women's rights that have been repeatedly
promulgated. We hear the language of women's human rights-in
the Women's Convention and the Fourth World Conference on
Women (Beijing, 1995) 5 2-but we have little proof of whether this
language is being backed up by meaningful action. Accepting the
Optional Protocol is one way to prove that action has been taken and
will continue to be taken in the future. A State which signs the
Optional Protocol is showing its willingness to be held accountable to
complaints that it is not adhering to its commitment to the Women's
Convention in a way that is open to international scrutiny. A State
that accepts the treaty, but not the Optional Protocol, is indicating a
reduced level of commitment to women's human fights.
Although other human rights treaties are important tools for
fighting human rights abuses in their own areas, they are insufficient
to ensure women's rights. Other treaties do have some provisions for
women. For example, Articles 2 and 3 of the ICCPR provide that
state parties undertake to ensure that women, equally with men, are
entitled to the rights set forth in the ICCPR.53 However, these various
articles are not enough to safeguard women's rights. "The Women's
Convention includes key rights not contained in the JCCPR, including
rights in the areas of education, employment and health care," to
name a few.54 The Women's Convention also analyzes the rights of
women in much greater detail. All of the state parties to the Women's
Convention are not party to the JCCPR. The importance of expertise
in this area cannot be underestimated. For example, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) would not have made certain
indictments without the expertise of female judges in the area of
sexual violence. "The most poignant example being that of Judge
Navanethem Pillay who in the ICTR's Akayesu case, had been
instrumental in questioning witnesses and evoking testimony of gross
sexual violence, resulting in additional charges being added to the
indictment.' '55 Although this took place in the context of a criminal
adjudication, it demonstrates that women's issues and rights can even
be overlooked by other well-meaning international human rights
bodies. The Human Rights Committee does not necessarily have the
52. Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, A/Conf.177/20 (1995).
53. ICCPR, supra note 12, arts. 2, 3.
54. Sullivan, supra note 45, at 1.
55. Cate Steains, Gender Issues, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 357, 378 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
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expertise required to deal adequately with the particular concerns of
women.
Experience has also shown that women's issues are not being
addressed by existing procedures. Out of the 597 complaints brought
under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR as of 1997, only
eleven had been brought on grounds of sex discrimination.5 6 As it is
obvious that women around the world are not being treated equally
with men, it is clear that this procedure is not working adequately to
ensure women's rights.
The importance of the Optional Protocol is especially great
when we consider that the Women's Convention requires state parties
to eliminate discrimination by private individuals.5 As women are
frequently the victims of discrimination or violence at the hands of
private individuals, the Optional Protocol will lead to greater
awareness of the violations women suffer at the private level which
can then be taken up at the national level.
The Optional Protocol also gives other actors, such as NGOs,
a framework within which to work to combat human rights abuses.
Amnesty International stated that "[d]espite the flaws, the Optional
Protocol is an important tool and Amnesty International will work
together with other non governmental organisations to promote a
clear and grassroots understanding of how it can be used to protect
women's human rights."58 The Optional Protocol gives human rights
organizations and other interested actors an added avenue to help
women around the world.
Not only is it practically very important for women to have a
means of enforcing the rights found in the Women's Convention
similar to the other main treaties, but it is also important on a
symbolic level. Although feminist critiques of rights question
whether acquiring legal rights advances women's equality, Hilary
Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright note that
"despite all these problems, the assertion of rights can exude great
symbolic force for oppressed groups within a society and it
56. Lilly Sucharipa-Behrmann, An Optional Protocol to CEDAW: A Further Step
Towards Strengthening of Women's Human Rights 6 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women).
57. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 2.
58. Press Release, Amnesty International USA, A Cautious Welcome to the Adoption
of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, http://www.amnesty-usa.org/news/199915100199.htm (Mar. 12, 1999).
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
constitutes an organizing principle in the struggle against
inequality, 59 and they quote from Patricia Williams:
"[r]ights" feels so new in the mouths of most black
people. It is still so deliciously empowering to say. It
is a sign for and a gift of selfhood that is very hard to
contemplate restructuring ... at this point in history. It
is the magic wand of visibility and invisibility, of
inclusion and exclusion, of power and no power .... 60
Up until now, the lack of an enforcement mechanism for the
Women's Convention marginalized the importance of women's
human rights. In fact, the only other major human rights treaty with
no enforcement mechanism is the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Why should women have any fewer tools at their disposal to
enforce their rights than men? Knowing that one has rights that are
recognized at an international level can be empowering, but knowing
that one has rights that can be enforced at the international level can
only be more empowering.
Although there has been criticism of the effectiveness of the
individual complaint mechanism as far as the individual making the
complaint is concerned, if the procedure is followed, individuals can,
in many cases, acquire remedies. Another former HRC member,
Bernhard Graefrath, argues "it starts too late, takes too much time,
does not lead to binding results and lacks any effective
enforcement. '61 The HRC has reported that in many cases its views
are not being followed,62 but that is a separate issue from whether the
procedure could give effective relief to individuals. Examining HRC
jurisprudence, it appears that if states follow the Committee's
recommendation, redress for the individual is available in many cases
even though it is true that the procedure may take years to come to
completion. For instance, in case No. 592/1994 (Clive Johnson v.
Jamaica), the author presented a birth certificate showing that he had
been under the age of eighteen when he committed the crime for
which he was convicted and given the death sentence.63 As Article 6,
paragraph 5 of the ICCPR prohibits the imposition of the death
sentence for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of
59. Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 613, 638 (1991).
60. Id. (quoting Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from
DeconstructedRights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401,431 (1987)).
61. Graefrath, supra note 44, at 327.
62. 1999 HRC Report, supra note 20, at 90.
63. Id. at 82.
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age, the HRC found that the imposition of the death sentence upon the
author of the complaint constituted a violation of the ICCPR.64
Clearly, in cases such as this, if the country follows the views of the
HRC, the individual involved would be given relief. In this case, an
individual who had been sentenced to death would no longer be
subject to the death penalty.
The Committee Against Torture receives complaints involving
petitioners who claim that their return to their country of origin or
extradition to another country by the country in which they are
presently living would violate that country's obligation under Article
3 of CAT. Under Article 3 of CAT, "[n]o state party shall expel,
return or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture."65 If the Committee finds that the individual
would be in danger of torture if returned to his or her country of
origin or extradited to another country and the country in which he or
she is presently living in does not return the individual there, then the
individual has clearly been given effective relief.66
Whether countries are following the views of the various
Committees is obviously very important, but it is a distinct question
from whether the procedure itself allows any meaningful relief to the
individual involved. Although there are cases in which the remedy
for the particular individual would come too late for effective relief, it
is evident that there are cases in which the individual's claims of
violation could be redressed even if the process is slow. During its
thirty-ninth session (July 1990), the HRC instituted a procedure to
enable it to monitor the follow-up of its views and created the
mandate for a Special Rapporteur for the follow-up on views.67 The
HRC considered roughly thirty percent of the replies received
satisfactory68 as they displayed the relevant state party's willingness
to implement the HRC's views or to offer the complainant an
64. Id.
65. CAT, supra note 13, art. 3.
66. For examples of views adopted by the Committee Against Torture in relation to
individual communications, see Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 53rd
Sess., Supp. No. 44, 265-286, U.N. Doe. A/53/44 (1998).
67. 1999 HRCReport, supra note 20, at 90. The mandate can be found in rule 95 of the
HRC Rules of Procedure, supra note 17.
68. According to the report, at the beginning of the HRC's sixty-sixth session in July
1999, follow-up information had been received in 152 cases and not received in 84 cases.
For nine of the cases for which information had not been received, the deadline for receipt
had not passed. 1999 HRC Report, supra note 20, at 90.
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appropriate remedy.69  This is clearly not an ideal situation.
However, the Optional Protocol incorporates many developments that
the HRC has established through the years to make its procedure
more effective that will hopefully make it an even stronger
instrument. The fact that the HRC has noted that its procedure is
being widely used, more now than ever, indicates that, although
perhaps evolving and working towards greater effectiveness, it is still
one important tool that can be utilized to ensure that crucial rights are
being respected throughout the world.
Even if the HRC's recommendations are not being met in one
hundred percent of the cases, as the Committee strives towards that
goal, the other valuable uses of the procedure cannot be forgotten.
Although so critical of the individual complaints mechanism as a tool
to redress the individual's right, Graefrath seems optimistic of the
procedure in other areas, saying "it stimulates the development and
improvement of internal remedy systems which cannot be neglected
by international supervisory bodies and-what is more important-
will have a corrective and preventive effect against human rights
violations." 70 Another former member of the HRC has also suggested
that the individual complaints mechanism "may serve as evidence of
systematic and/or massive violations of certain rights in a given
country. 7 1 Although the cases that are brought before the Committee
are determined by chance (i.e., by who happens to bring a complaint),
such individual cases may indicate a larger context of violations.
Another benefit of the individual complaints mechanism is
that "[c]onsideration of individual cases provides the supervisory
body with an opportunity to interpret human rights guarantees in a
manner which general discussions and exegeses do not provide."72
The case law can be an important tool in defining the scope of the
obligations under the Convention and may lead to changes in
domestic level decision making that benefit other individuals. The
existence of such a procedure may also lead many states to examine
their obligations under international human rights treaties more
carefully before declaring a case closed at the national level for fear
of having it re-opened at the international level. When the existence
69. Id.
70. Graefrath, supra note 44, at 322.
71. Rein Miullerson, The Efficiency of the Individual Complaint Procedures: The
Experience of CCPR, CERD, CAT and ECHR, in MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE:
COMPARING INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS 25, 27 (Arie Bloed et al. eds.,
1993).
72. Byrnes & Connors, supra note 11, at 703.
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of the procedure and the state's commitment to the treaty involved
has not led to the avoidance of a violation, the procedure may allow
states the opportunity to re-examine issues in a new light once the
case has been re-opened. As the case will have been commented on
from the perspective of another body staffed with experts on human
rights, the state involved, as well as other states, may be able to see
the scope and meaning of their obligations more clearly.
Under the first optional protocol to the ICCPR, it has become
apparent that individual complaints generate much more press than
reports made under Article 40 of the ICCPR.73 Publicity can be a
vital tool in ensuring state compliance. The HRC reported that better
public awareness of its procedure, as well as the increasing number of
state parties to the OP, has "led to a growth in the number of
communications submitted to the Committee." 74 As states do not
want to be embarrassed by any negative publicity, this may help urge
them on in their quest to fulfill their international obligations. The
more publicity the procedure gets, the more people become aware that
there is an international outlet for their complaints and may thereafter
come forward if their rights have been violated.
V. THE INQUIRY PROCEDURE
The inquiry procedure whereby the Committee can initiate its
own investigations of possible widespread violations in a particular
country is similar to that in use by CAT.75 This is an important
addition to the Women's Convention, as women who may fear
reprisals do not have the tools available to bring a complaint, and
individual communications may not reflect the systematic nature of
violations.76
The Economic and Social Council created the Commission on
the Status of Women's (CSW) Communications Procedure under
which CSW can receive communications that appear to reveal a
consistent pattern of injustice or discriminatory practice. However,
the CSW, which is composed of state representatives, not independent
experts, only has to power to make recommendations to the Economic
and Social Council and is not linked to the legal framework of the
73. Id. at 704.
74. 1999 HRC Report, supra note 20, at 74.
75. There are also similar procedures under the ILO and Res. 1503, but they are outside
the scope of the present paper.
76. Byrnes & Connors, supra note 11, at 704.
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CEDAW Committee.77 A 1991 report by the Secretary-General to
CSW indicated, in addition to the above, that this procedure is weak
as compared to others.78 The CSW's reports only reflect trends
observed in the communications, not details of the individual
complaints.79 The inquiry procedure in the Optional Protocol also has
the ability "to enhance collaboration between the Committee and
NGOs" by enabling the NGOs to highlight "systematic human rights
violations." 80  Clearly, the present system is not an adequate
substitute for the inquiry procedure that will be in place when the
Optional Protocol comes into force.
The Committee Against Torture, pursuant to its Article 20
inquiry procedure, has conducted an investigation on Turkey.81 After
having received reliable information that torture was practiced
systematically in Turkey, the CAT inquiry included a mission to
Turkey during which Committee members visited places of detention
under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of
Justice.82 In the final statement of the report of the Committee
Against Torture, the Committee notes with satisfaction "the
cooperation of the Turkish authorities during the inquiry, and
congratulates them on having acted on many of its recommendations
and taken measures intended to reinforce the implementation of the
Convention and to improve the human rights situation in Turkey." 83
Although the Committee went on to confirm the existence and
systematic character of torture in Turkey, changes in the law were
made as a result of the inquiry and people working at the national
level now have a complete report to use as a weapon if further
violations ensue. Although this procedure may not be as widely
subscribed to as states are hesitant to allow such "intrusive" methods
of ensuring compliance-a mission of experts is actually allowed to
investigate a specific country's compliance in detail, and perhaps in
person-the CAT report indicates that progress can be made using
this procedure.
77. Sullivan, supra note 45, at 4.
78. Byrnes & Connors, supra note 11, at 690.
79. Roberta Jacobsen, The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 444, 449 (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
80. Ursula A. O'Hare, Ending the 'Ghettoisation': The Right of individual Petition to
the Women's Convention, 5 WEB J. CURRENT L. ISSUES (1997), at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.ukl
1997/issue5/o'hare5.html#Headingl5.
81. Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No, 44, at
3, U.N. Doe. A/48/44/Add.1 (1993).
82. Id. at 5-15.
83. Id. at 58.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, ensuring the rights of women must be done at the
national level. The Optional Protocol is a critical means towards
reaching that goal.
[T]he Optional Protocol will act as an incentive for
Governments to take a fresh look at the means of
redress that are currently available to women at the
domestic level. This is perhaps the most important
contribution of the Optional Protocol. It is action at
the national level which will create the environment in
which women and girls are able to enjoy all their
human rights fully, and where their grievances will be
addressed with the efficiency and speed they
deserve.84
It is clear that no mechanism at the international level will work
effectively to ensure all individual rights at the national level.
However, states that become party to such enforcement procedures
are announcing to the world that they are ready to work with the
international community towards full compliance with their
international obligations in realization of the importance of human
rights that have been overlooked throughout history.
The state of the international community today allows for
states to voluntarily submit their national systems to international
scrutiny. This benefits the entire international community because
these state parties are working now towards clearer definitions of
obligations and honing the tools with which to combat violations that
may also later be used by states not yet parties to such procedures.
By signing the Optional Protocol, states can help women realize their
equality, a basic and fundamental human right.
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